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Mary Shepherd's Two Senses of Necessary Connection  
 
Mary Shepherd's proof of external existence rests on an account of cause and effect. At the 
same time, ideas of cause and effect are explained in terms of the mechanical action of 
external objects on sense organs. This sounds circular. Shepherd claims that the circularity 
can be avoided if we attend to differences between the 'internal and external existence of 
objects perceived and unperceived' and the method and action of causation.  I will show that 
Shepherd's two senses of necessary connection, when understood with attention to the 
distinction between perceived internal, objects and unperceived, external objects, shed light 
on her response to the circularity problem.  
 
By Jennifer McRobert
Mary Shepherd's Two Senses of Necessary Connection  
 
Shepherd's two major philosophical works, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect 
and Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, were published in 1824 and 1827. As 
the titles suggest, the subject of the first work is the causal relation; while the subject of the 
1827 Essays is our knowledge of external existence. Evidently, the undertakings in the two 
books differ in nature. However, as Shepherd is careful to point out, the books are united by 
an underlying account of causality.
1
 Shepherd explains that 
 
 'the subjects of the two Essays are capable of being considered independently, yet of 
throwing a mutual light upon each other.'... 'The analysis, therefore, of the operations of 
mind from infancy, throws light upon the knowledge we have of cause and effect; and the 
relation of cause and effect when fully known and established, affords the only method of 
proof in our power, for the knowledge of external existence.'
2
  
 
It is apparent from these remarks that Shepherd intends to rest her proof of external 
existence on an account of cause and effect. At the same time, she has elsewhere argued 
that ideas of cause and effect are to be explained in terms of the mechanical action of 
external objects on sense organs. This sounds circular, and Shepherd does in fact see the 
circularity. However, she immediately dismisses the threat, saying that her analysis will not 
amount to  
 
 'reasoning in a circle if by carefully defining the nature of internal and external 
existence of objects perceived and unperceived, we gain thereby clearer ideas of the 
method and action of causation.'
3
  
 
Shepherd's claim then, is that the circularity problem can be avoided if we attend to 
differences between the 'internal and external existence of objects perceived and 
unperceived' and the method and action of causation. What could she possibly have in mind? 
As I will show, Shepherd's two senses of necessary connection, when understood with 
attention to the distinction between perceived internal, objects and unperceived, external 
objects, shed light on her response to the circularity problem.  
 
To begin, we'll need to consider Shepherd's two senses of necessary connection, which are 
described in her 1827 Essays: 
  
 The necessary connection therefore of cause and effect arises from the obligation 
that like qualities should arise from the junction, separation, admixture, &c. of aggregates 
of external qualities. But the necessary connection of invariable antecedency and 
subsequency of successive aggregates of sensible qualities' arises from the necessity 
'that there should be invariable sequences of effects, when one common cause (or 
exterior object) mixes successively with different organs of sense, or various parts of the 
human frame, & c. 
4
   
  
Notice that Shepherd's two senses of necessary connection presuppose her distinction 
between 'perceived internal qualities' and the 'external aggregates of qualities'.
5
 Internal 
perceived objects, as Shepherd explains, are compounds of ideas and sensible qualities. 
They are determined to the mind in representation and are ultimately due to the action of 
exterior objects on sense organs. By way of contrast, exterior, unperceived objects -- the 
causes of the various species of sensible ideas -- are not directly known. They do, however, 
indirectly afford a basis for our inferences about external existence.
 6
 But, as all of this still 
sounds very circular, we will need to look more closely at the details of Shepherd's account of 
necessary connection to see whether she succeeds in escaping the circularity. 
 
The first sense of necessary connection that we will consider is the sense that is discovered 
through the direct examination of sequences in our representations. Shepherd clears the way 
for this account by first rejecting Hume's alternative analysis. She rejects, for example, 
Hume's claim that the experience of regular succession is adequate to account for the 
subject's sense of necessary connection. Indeed, she entirely rejects Hume's definition of 
causality based on 'the customary antecedency and subsequency of sensible qualities'. Hume 
errs, she thinks, because he mistakenly considers sensible qualities which have been 
determined to the senses to be causes, when such perceived qualities must always be 
considered to be dependent qualities, or effects. Moreover, it is a mistake to attribute temporal 
associations that arise when sensible qualities are noticed by the mind to the perceived 
sensible qualities themselves. In doing so, Hume compounds his initial error, and ends with a 
definition of causality that is based on the temporal succession of sensible qualities. Shepherd 
describes the basis for her rejection of Hume's view as follows: 
 
 This impossibility of sensible qualities, being the productive principle of sensible 
qualities, lies at the root of all Mr. Hume's controversy concerning the manner of 
causation; for he, observing that such ideas could only follow one another, resolved 
causation into the observations of the customary antecedency and subsequency of 
sensible qualities.  But objects, when spoken of and considered as causes, should always 
be considered as those masses of unknown qualities in nature, exterior to the organs of 
the sense, whose determination of sensible qualities to the sense forms one class of their 
effects; whereas philosophers, (with the exception of Berkeley) and mankind in general, 
look upon the masses of sensible qualities after determination to the senses as the 
causes, the antecedents, the productive principles of other masses of sensible qualities, 
which are their effects or subsequents; a notion naturally arising from the powerful style of 
the associations in the mind, and which our Maker has ordained for practical purposes;--
but monstrous when held as an abstract truth in analytical science.
7
 
 
In sum, Shepherd holds that Hume's doctrine rests on a faulty analysis of cause and effect. 
Hume is wrong, she claims, to think that noticing the temporal order of sensible qualities is 
essential to causal judgement; indeed, this view of causality is based on an incorrect analysis 
of causal objects.
8 
  
 
Having rejected Hume's definition of causality, Shepherd proposes a form of a priorism, 
arguing "That reason, not fancy and 'custom', leads us to the knowledge 'That everything 
which begins to exist must have a Cause.'" This causal axiom, according to Shepherd, follows 
from the impossibility of conceiving of causes and effects as existing apart without 
contradiction.
9
 Taken as a bald assertion, that is, without much appreciation for Shepherd's 
doctrine of causality, the claim is hard to fathom. It might appear, for example, that Shepherd 
commits a fallacy when she says that to deny her causal axiom leads to contradiction.
10
 For, 
as Hume showed, the principle that 'All effects have causes' cannot be used to justify the 
inference that 'All events have causes'.
11
 Shepherd, however, denies that there is an empirical 
distinction to be made between effects and events, since 'objects usually considered as 
effects' always appear to us as 'dependent qualities' that begin to exist.
12
 Hence, as a matter 
of psychological fact, the 'dependent qualities' of which we take notice are one and all felt 
events that begin to exist. As Shepherd writes,  
 
 Here is a new quality, which appears to my senses: But it could not arise of itself; nor 
could any surrounding objects, but one (or more) affect it; therefore that one, (or more) 
have occasioned it, for there is nothing else to make a difference; and a difference could 
not 'begin of itself'.
13
 
 
Hence, Shepherd's reply to Hume hinges on her claim that the causal axiom 'That everything 
which begins to exist must have a cause' is discovered through introspective analysis of the  
'manner and action of causation'.
14
 For, 'when the mind perceives by what passes within itself, 
that no quality, idea, or being whatever, can begin its own existence, it...perceives the general 
necessity of a cause for every effect'.
15
 Given the discovery of the causal axiom it can be 
shown that any attempt to think 'dependent qualities that begin to exist' as uncaused leads to 
contradiction.
16
 As Shepherd points out, our representations are necessarily bound up and 
consistent with the causal axiom, so that once the sensations of ideas and sensible qualities 
in our representations are fully examined and understood, the sense of causal connection that 
follows is seen to be necessary. Thus, necessary connection is a priori -- and it is known in 
this way because it is a necessary consequence of a causal axiom that is itself known a priori.  
 
It is important to note that at this stage, Shepherd has ventured nothing about the specific 
propositions of natural science and their necessity. Shepherd provides a separate argument 
to show that natural laws exhibit necessary connection. The argument is intended to prove 
that 'Nature cannot be supposed to alter her Course without a contradiction in terms' and 'that 
Custom and Habit alone are not our guides; but chiefly reason, for the regulation of our 
expectations in ordinary life'. Moreover, it turns out that the discovery and justification of 
necessary connection in natural laws is much the same as the discovery and justification of 
necessary connection in any of our representations. For Shepherd, all such reasoning is 
viewed as 'experimental' in nature, and is based on a two-step method: 
  Thus all experimental reasoning consists in an observation, and a demonstration, as 
has been shown; --an observation whether the circumstances from which an object is 
produced, and in which it is placed, are the same upon one occasion as upon another; --
and a demonstration, that if it is so, all its exhibitions will be the same.
17
  
 
In the first step, the mind takes notice of 'like qualities' and 'invariable sequences of effects' in 
compound sense objects, and the invariability of the sequence leads us to conclude that there 
probably exists a causal connection.
18
 Next, an experimentum crucis is performed in which 
the mind considers whether the difference in qualities could have begun of itself, and 
concludes that 'after the application of an exact experiment, it is impossible to imagine a 
difference of qualities to arise under the same circumstances'.
19
 And, when an external object 
gives rise to an invariable sequence of qualities that passes the test of the experimentum 
crucis, we say that we have discovered a necessary connection of cause and effect.
20
 Thus, 
any necessity discovered through empirical investigation is demonstrated independently of the 
scientific investigation that led to empirical generalisation. As such, the sense of necessary 
connection discovered in an empirical generalisation only becomes apparent to us once the 
ideas and meanings contained in the representations in our propositions are fully examined.  
 
The force of Shepherd's answer to Hume seems to rest on her view that questions relating to 
a posteriori knowledge of cause and effect lead directly to questions pertaining to a priori 
knowledge of the causal relation.
21
 In developing this point, Shepherd introduces a sense of a 
priori that extends beyond what Hume would have understood by the term. For Hume, to say 
that something that is known a priori is just to say that it is known by analysis alone; whereas 
Shepherd makes it explicit that on her view, experience leads us to the discovery a priori 
knowledge. Her view is perhaps best understood in conjunction with Kant's famous remark 
(made in the Introduction to his first Critique) that 'though all of our knowledge begins with 
experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience'.
22
 What Kant means is that 
we discover a priori truth with the help of experience, but that the justification for such truth is 
itself independent of particular experience. This is a good way to understand Shepherd's view 
that the a posteriori question concerning necessary connection is 'sunk in' the a priori one. As 
Shepherd explains: 
  
 It may be plainly seen, that the first of these questions (a posteriori) is sunk in the 
latter(a priori), because, if objects usually considered as effects need not be considered 
as effects, then they are forced to begin their existences of themselves; for, conjoined or 
not to their causes, we know by our senses that they do begin to exist: we will, therefore, 
immediately hasten to the consideration of the second question (a priori), which may be 
stated in the following terms: Whether every object which begins to exist must owe its 
existence to a cause?
 23
 
 
In effect, what Shepherd proposes is an 'epistemological ascent' from introspection and 
empirical generalisation to talk of necessary connection. Such an account might not satisfy 
the post-Humean critic of causality, but it does count as one kind of answer to Hume. 
Moreover, Shepherd's necessitarian response is not an entirely new one. It has earlier 
Continental roots, especially, but not exclusively, in Kant. And, as it turns out, Kant's response 
to Hume is helpful for appraising the general aims and significance of Shepherd's 
philosophical contribution. 
 
Kant explains that his own critical philosophy was inspired by Hume's critique of metaphysical 
concepts such as causality.
24
 Indeed, Hume had demonstrated that,  
 
 We cannot at all see why, in consequence of the existence of one thing, another must 
necessarily exist or how the concept of such a combination can arise a priori.  Hence he 
inferred that reason was altogether deluded with reference to this concept [i.e. that of 
cause and effect]...
25
  
 
Kant saw Hume's critique of causality not only as an undermining of the old procedures in 
metaphysics, but also as a threat to natural science, rendering it no better than fiction and 
fantasy. His response to Hume was to show that the concepts and propositions of 
metaphysics and science can in fact be known a priori. Specifically, Kant argues that 
metaphysical concepts such as causality are necessary, universal, and objective, and that 
reason infers objective knowledge from our representations of the empirical world. Shepherd's 
own response to Hume is based on a similar claim. For Shepherd, not only do we have 
knowledge of causal necessity, but necessary connection is discovered by means of a causal 
axiom that is known a priori. Thus, the similarity to Kant's view is readily apparent. 
 
So much for the first of Shepherd's senses of necessary connection. Doubtless, Hume would 
object that Shepherd's account is based on her mistaken assumptions about representation, 
and that her appeals to deductive tests are therefore useless to assist in her cause. Moreover, 
Hume clearly rules out the legitimacy of appeals to experimental philosophy to justify our 
expectations for the future. He remarks that such appeals 'must evidently be going in a circle 
and taking that which is the very point in question for granted.'
26
 Why then, does Shepherd 
think that she has escaped the circularity charge and provided a basis for proof of our 
knowledge of external existence? In order to pursue this question further, we will need to 
attend to Shepherd's second sense of necessary connection.  
 
 
Shepherd's second sense of necessary connection derives from her belief that there is 
substantial evidence for metaphysical determinism. In this instance, the necessary connection 
discovered in knowledge is understood in connection with the metaphysical necessity that 
governs unperceived, exterior objects in nature. As Shepherd writes, 'all of the exterior and 
uncombined objects, whose junction is necessary to an event' are causes that lead up to the 
proximate cause that we identify with an event.
27
 For the moment, we shall leave aside the full 
details of Shepherd's appeal to metaphysical determinism, in order to consider the 
epistemological  implications that she draws from this assumption. For there is a further 
aspect to her view of knowledge that derives from the assumption of metaphysical 
determinism. This point is best explained in connection with Shepherd's 1827 Essays and her 
claim that all knowledge must be subsumed under the causal axiom.  
 
In the 1827 Essays, Shepherd continually draws attention to the fact that all knowledge, 
regardless of character, turns on reasoning about causes. Consider the following examples: 
The sense organs, she says, are known by inference to their causal role in bringing about 
effects of which we are conscious.
28
 Similarly, ideas of moral and aesthetic worth, she argues, 
are dependent on the activities of the brain and nervous system, and ultimately on the actions 
of thinking minds.
29
 Likewise, knowledge of final causes depends on an analysis of causation; 
for, ideas of final causes are mental qualities discernible in the sensations of the actions of 
the brain.
30
 Finally, where there is evidence for design in creation, there is also evidence for 
the action of efficient causes equal to bringing about the 'contrivance'. It is evident then, that 
Shepherd holds causal reasoning to be central to all forms of knowledge, including, as might 
be surmised, knowledge of the existence of a Deity.  
 
 
Shepherd's design argument does not have the character of a 'demonstrative proof'; it is an 
argument by analogy. The argument is, of course, tied to her assumption of metaphysical 
determinism. Indeed, Shepherd clearly has a theistic agenda. As Blakey explains, Shepherd 
worried that Hume's doctrine would lead, by 'inevitable consequence', to 'downright atheism'. 
For, Hume's denial of the causal maxim that every effect must have a cause destroys 'at one 
fell swoop, the foundation of all arguments for the existence and providence of a Diety.'
31
 In 
contrast to Hume, Shepherd argues that the analysis of the mind's contents enables us to 
discover the causal axiom, which, in turn, forms the basis for our beliefs about external 
existence. These beliefs, she argues, continually point to metaphysical determinism. 
Ultimately, this analysis forms the basis for our belief in God as the only cause sufficient to 
bring about such a world. Indeed, 'contemplation upon the phenomena of nature' leads us to 
conclude that, in order to 'account for the facts' there must be 'one intelligent being' that is the 
'renovating power for all the dependent effects, all the secondary causes beneath our view.'
32
 
With arguments such as these, it is evident that Shepherd takes causal reasoning to underlie 
all inference to external existence. Thus, on the strength of her 1824 defense of the causal 
relation, Shepherd supposes there to be evidence for both metaphysical necessity and a 
Divine Creator.
33
  
 Shepherd's continual return to the subject of causality in the 1827 Essays is, of course, to be 
expected.  Her expressed intention is to rely on cause and effect in proving knowledge of 
external existence. As Shepherd writes, '...the question concerning the nature and reality of 
external existence can only receive a satisfactory answer, derived from a knowledge of the 
relation of Cause and Effect.' 
34
 But it is worth noting how and why Shepherd's arguments for 
external existence underscore this dependence, -- because this dependence, it turns out, is a 
dependence on the causal axiom.  
 
To see how the dependence on the causal axiom is supposed to work, consider Shepherd's 
argument that the causal axiom supplies a basis for all inferences to external existence. Once 
the variety in sensation has been detected and analysed, we are able to infer, using the 
causal axiom, the existence of continuous, external, and independent objects.
35
 As Shepherd 
writes, 'continuous existence is known by inference, not by sensation; for every sensation 
passes away, and another is created ? but none of these, in its turn, could 'begin its own 
existence;' therefore they are but changes upon the existences which are already in being ? 
they are effects requiring causes.
36
 But as each mind could not change, unless interfered 
with, therefore the interfering object is exterior to the mind'.
37
 She later adds that 'Those 
circumstances which go to prove that there must be truly outward causes, for particular 
sensations, prove them to be independent causes of those sensations.'
38
 
  
In addition to seeing how Shepherd's appeal to the causal axiom features in the arguments of 
the 1827 Essays, it is worth taking note of why she does so. For, Shepherd's continual return 
to the causal axiom is very deliberate, and it reflects her aspiration to a systematic philosophy. 
Indeed, it would appear that subsumption under a causal axiom generalizes to everything in 
creation, which is itself, of course, causally determined. To 'understand God aright' she says, 
'he cannot work a contradiction; he cannot occasion the same objects without any alteration 
amidst them supposed to produce dissimilar effects.'
39
 What Shepherd means, effectively, is 
that because God created a deterministic world, our knowledge of such a world must be 
consistent with the causal axiom.
40
 As Shepherd reminds us 'All laws of nature are 
comprehended in one universal law, that similar qualities being in union, there will arise 
similar results'.
41
 Shepherd's view then, is that all objects and events in the world were 
created by God in conformity with a consistent set of ideas based around the causal axiom. 
Metaphysical determinism implies that God made the world such that it corresponds to the 
idea of cause expressed by the axiom 'every event has a cause.' Hence every event in the 
universe conforms to this axiom, not only by having a cause, but also by being such that it 
could not exist without a cause.  
 
An interesting implication of Shepherd's view is that every law of nature is a necessary law in 
virtue of its following analytically from some idea used by God in creating the world. Moreover, 
potentially, any empirical truth, when fully understood, might be seen to be a necessary truth. 
This view collapses the traditional distinction between laws of nature and the propositions of 
mathematics. Consider, for example, Shepherd's interpretation that Newton rightly attributes 
necessity to the law of gravitation.
42
 Shepherd doubts that there could have existed even 'the 
slightest shade of difference between the degree of his [Newton's] assent to this inductive 
result, and that extorted from him by a demonstration of Euclid [?]'
43
 On her view, the shared 
degree of necessity underlying mathematical theorems and the law of universal gravitation 
follows because both must have one and the same foundation. As Shepherd explains, 'THE 
DOCTRINE OF CAUSATION IS UNDERSTOOD BY SCHOLARS AS THE BASE ON WHICH THE TRUTH OF 
EVERY THEOREM IS SURELY BUILT.'
44
 For, 'when objects are formed the same upon one 
occasion as another' she reasons, 'their qualities, properties, and effects, will be similar.' She 
adds that 'It is this proposition on which mathematical demonstration, and physical induction 
equally, and only, rest for their truth.'
45
 Thus the certainty in mathematics is dependent on the 
manner and action of causation that we trace in the 'original FORMATIONS of the objects', and 
necessity in physical laws follows along similar lines. True physical laws are not merely 
contingent, they are also necessary. Shepherd concludes that, 'the science of mathematics is 
truly but one branch of physics' since 'all the conclusions its method of induction 
demonstrates, depend on the truth of the proposition 'That like cause must have like effect'.
46
  
  
 'That like cause must have like effect;' a proposition which being the only foundation 
for the truths of physical science, and which gives validity to the result of any experiment 
whatever, ranks mathematics as a species under the same genus; where the same 
proposition is the basis, there is truly but one science, however subdivided afterwards.'
47
 
 
Given what has been said so far, the close connection that Shepherd draws between 
mathematics and physics is not that surprising. Shepherd makes it clear that causal 
reasoning is central to just about anything that could deserve to be called 'knowledge'. This is, 
evidently, quite simply a consequence of the metaphysically deterministic world that God has 
created.   
 
There are, of course, precedents for the view that necessity in knowledge follows from the 
way that God made the world. Kant, for example, held that there is a unity of visible and 
invisible worlds, and that this unity justifies the appeal to systematic unity as a criterion of 
truth. For Kant then, the appeal to the a priori elements in representation is only part of the 
story when it comes to empirical truth. He also has other methodological considerations in 
view -- second order desiderata that supply criteria for judging the status of a theory. Kant 
links these criteria to a drive on the part of reason to unify knowledge. He writes that reason's 
unity '...aids us in discovering a principle for the understanding in its manifold and special 
modes of employment, directing its attention to cases which are not given, and thus rendering 
it more coherent.'
48
  
  
 For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity is a necessary law, 
inasmuch as without it we should not possess a faculty of reason, nor without reason a 
consistent and self accordant mode of employing the understanding, nor, in the absence 
of this, any proper and sufficient criterion of empirical truth.  In relation to this criterion, 
therefore, we must suppose the idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess 
objective validity and necessity.
49
 
 
Thus, reason requires us to seek unity in science, and this unity ultimately secures the sort of 
necessity for the law-likeness that we find in the 'order of nature'
50
 As Kant explains in his 
Critique of Pure Reason, empirical laws must be thought to be necessary because reason 
regards them to be part of a systematic and unified order of nature. Kant describes the 
relationship between particular empirical generalizations and the unity of the 'order of nature' 
in just this way: 
 
 ...that we are justified in declaring all possible cognitions -- empirical and others -- to 
possess systematic unity, and to be subject to general principles from which, 
notwithstanding their various character, they are all derivable -- such an assertion can be 
founded only upon a  transcendental principle of reason, which would render this 
systematic unity not subjectively and logically -- in its character of a method, but 
objectively necessary.
51
 
 
Kant's view then, is that empirical law-likeness is partly the result of an embedding in a 
system or theory under a few general principles. On his view, the embedding is justified by 
appeal to transcendental principles. As we have seen, a similar tendency toward systematicity 
and subsumption is evident in Shepherd's philosophy. However, on Shepherd's account, it is 
explicit that we have necessary knowledge because the subsumptive causal axiom resembles 
the ideas of cause and effect used by God in his creation of the physical world. Moreover, 
subsumption is a legitimate methodological goal, presumably because God intended us to 
have knowledge of the physical world, and so created the world using ideas that resemble our 
causal axiom. 
 
We have now considered Shepherd's two senses of necessary connection and their 
implications for knowledge of cause and effect and external existence.  However, we have yet 
to answer our original question; namely 'Why does Shepherd summarily dismiss the circularity 
problem in her proof of external existence?' Having carefully distinguished external, 
unperceived objects and internal, perceived objects and the two different senses of necessary 
connection, we see that Shepherd has in fact taken steps to address the circularity problem. 
Her efforts to avoid circularity can be linked to the two kinds of epistemic constraints on 
empirical truth implicit in her accounts of necessary connection. First, there are the 
constraints on empirical knowledge from the a priori causal axiom and its role in 
representation. Secondly, there are the constraints supplied by the systematic unity in our 
knowledge of nature. Shepherd takes both sorts of epistemic constraints quite seriously, and 
it is perhaps in view of these constraints that she anticipates an escape from circularity. In 
particular, Shepherd's second sense of necessary connection, the sense that justifies the 
search for systematic unity and subsumption under the causal axiom, holds promise for such 
an escape. For subsumption and systematicity extend Shepherd's account of necessity, so 
that there are quite simply more sources of necessity in theoretical knowledge. In thus 
widening her account of necessary and empirical truth, Shepherd extends her view of 
scientific knowledge well beyond the empirical generalization view that Hume likely had in 
mind when he claimed that an appeal to experimental philosophy would amount to a circular 
justification for our future expectations.  
 
Hence, Shepherd's second sense of necessary connection, although it comes loaded with 
metaphysical and theological presuppositions (which she does, of course, try to defend by 
argumentation), extends further support for her claim that we can draw inferences from the 
marks of objective reality to knowledge of an external world. The success of such a strategy is 
surely open to dispute, but in the end, it helps to widen the circle enough to make room for a 
more compelling account of the inferential and subsumptive character of our knowledge of 
external existence. Most importantly, it enables Shepherd to develop a representational theory 
that is less obviously circular --if not entirely free of the circularity -- that she so readily 
dismisses. 
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Mary Shepherd (1777- 1847).  
 
Shepherd's two major philosophical works: An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect 
(1824) and Essays on the Perception of an External Universe (1827). 
 
'...the subjects of the two Essays are capable of being considered independently, yet of 
throwing a mutual light upon each other.'... 'The analysis, therefore, of the operations of mind 
from infancy, throws light upon the knowledge we have of cause and effect; and the relation of 
cause and effect when fully known and established, affords the only method of proof in our 
power, for the knowledge of external existence.' (Shepherd 1827, xiv-xvi)  
 
[The analysis will not amount to] '...reasoning in a circle if by carefully defining the nature of 
internal and external existence of objects perceived and unperceived, we gain thereby clearer 
ideas of the method and action of causation.' (Shepherd 1827, xii) 
  
The necessary connection therefore of cause and effect, arises from the obligation, that like 
qualities should arise from the junction, separation, admixture, &c. of aggregates of external 
qualities. [Sense 2] But the necessary connection of invariable antecedency and 
subsequency of successive aggregates of sensible qualities' arises from the necessity 'that 
there should be invariable sequences of effects, when one common cause (or exterior object) 
mixes successively with different organs of sense, or various parts of the human frame, & c. 
[Sense 1] (Shepherd 1827, 130-1)  
 
This impossibility of sensible qualities, being the productive principle of sensible qualities, lies 
at the root of all Mr. Hume's controversy concerning the manner of causation; for he, 
observing that such ideas could only follow one another, resolved causation into the 
observations of the customary antecedency and subsequency of sensible qualities.  But 
objects, when spoken of and considered as causes, should always be considered as those 
masses of unknown qualities in nature, exterior to the organs of the sense, whose 
determination of sensible qualities to the sense forms one class of their effects; whereas 
philosophers, (with the exception of Berkeley) and mankind in general, look upon the masses 
of sensible qualities after determination to the senses as the causes, the antecedents, the 
productive principles of other masses of sensible qualities, which are their effects or 
subsequents; a notion naturally arising from the powerful style of the associations in the mind, 
and which our Maker has ordained for practical purposes;--but monstrous when held as an 
abstract truth in analytical science. (Shepherd 1827, 126-7) 
Here is a new quality, which appears to my senses: But it could not arise of itself; nor could 
any surrounding objects, but one (or more) affect it; therefore that one, (or more) have 
occasioned it, for there is nothing else to make a difference; and a difference could not 'begin 
of itself'. (Shepherd 1824, 43-4) 
 
Thus all experimental reasoning consists in an observation, and a demonstration, as has 
been shown; --an observation whether the circumstances from which an object is produced, 
and in which it is placed, are the same upon one occasion as upon another; --and a 
demonstration, that if it is so, all its exhibitions will be the same. (Shepherd 1824, 108)  
 
It may be plainly seen, that the first of these questions is sunk in the latter, because, if objects 
usually considered as effects need not be considered as effects, then they are forced to begin 
their existences of themselves; for, conjoined or not to their causes, we know by our senses 
that they do begin to exist: we will, therefore, immediately hasten to the consideration of the 
second question, which may be stated in the following terms: Whether every object which 
begins to exist must owe its existence to a cause?
 
(Shepherd 1824, 34) 
 [Hume demonstrated that] We cannot at all see why, in consequence of the existence of one 
thing, another must necessarily exist or how the concept of such a combination can arise a 
priori.  Hence he inferred that reason was altogether deluded with reference to this concept [of 
cause and effect]...(Kant, IV, 257) 
 
All laws of nature are comprehended in one universal law, that similar qualities being in union, 
there will arise similar results. (Shepherd 1827, 329) 
 
In short, did there exist the slightest shade of difference between the degree of his [Newton's] 
assent to this inductive result, and that extorted from him by a demonstration of Euclid?  
(Shepherd 1827, 278) 
 
"That like cause must have like effect;" a proposition which being the only foundation for the 
truths of physical science, and which gives validity to the result of any experiment whatever, 
ranks mathematics as a species under the same genus; where the same proposition is the 
basis, there is truly but one science, however subdivided afterwards.' (Shepherd 1827, 278-9) 
 
For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as 
without it we should not possess a faculty of reason, nor without reason a consistent and self 
accordant mode of employing the understanding, nor, in the absence of this, any proper and 
sufficient criterion of empirical truth.  In relation to this criterion, therefore, we must suppose 
the idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective validity and necessity. (Kant, 
Critique, A 647/B 675) 
 
...that we are justified in declaring all possible cognitions -- empirical and others -- to possess 
systematic unity, and to be subject to general principles from which, notwithstanding their 
various character, they are all derivable -- such an assertion can be founded only upon a  
transcendental principle of reason, which would render this systematic unity not subjectively 
and logically -- in its character of a method, but objectively necessary. (Kant, Critique, A 648/B 
676) 
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